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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

RULON BRERETON,
)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (
)
vs.
RALPH DIXON,
Defendant and Appellant.

CASE
NO. 10,687

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
The respondent agrees with the appellant's statement
of the nature of the case.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The respondent agrees with 1Jhe appellant's statement
of the disposition in the lower court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the verdict sustained.

2
STATEMENT 01' FACTS

The respondent agrees in substance with the appellant's statement of facts, but believes the following clarifications and corrections should be made:
The orchard was a relatively new orchard that had
just come into full production (R. 171, 173). It could be
called a prime 011Chard lR. 146, 173) , and had no prior record of earnings ( R. 174). The respondent was able to harvest the entire fruit crop with the help of his family (R.
145), and could market his entire crop locally without the
marketing expense incident to commercial operations (R.
146).
The respondent's orchard fit like the top of the "T"
across the property of Provo City upon which the appellant
was constructing the fire station. There was not any intervening ground, except that part of the fire did burn land
on the west side of Provo City's property on its way to the
respondent's property, but in the main the fire went directly from Provo City's property to that of the respondent.
The fire burned 111 trees (R. 159); however, there is
a conflict as to the amount of damage done to the pear
trees. The respondent's experts sa:id they were totally destroyed, and the appellant's expert disagreed in resped to
the pear trees (R. 325). The respondent's experts agreed
that there were 51 peach trees destroyed (R. 133). The
appellant's e~rt did not count the damaged or destroyed
peach trees (R. 324). Mr. Brereton and his experts claimed
60 pear trees were also destroyed (R. 133, 142).
The appellant states in his statement of facts that he
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takes exception to the court's Instruction No. 21, but we
are certain his complaint is to Instruction No. 20 (R. 144).
ARGUMENT

POINT I
TIIE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE AS TO THE VALUE OF TREES INDEPENDENT OF THE LAND.
It is respectfully submitted that Jury Instruction

Forms, Utah, 90.40, is not necessarily designed to cover
the particular damage issue of this case. It is further submitted that JIFU was never intended to cover all instructions essential to cover all legal propositions to be submitted to juries. The authors and editor of the publication
very candidly state in the preface of JIFU that the publication is intended as an aid to the court, and they do
not purport it to be all inclusive. The respondent, therefore, takes issue with the appellant's conclusion concerning
the application of JIFU recommended Instruction 90.40 as
being appropriate to the issue.
The damage issue in this case is one of first impression
in Utah; however, we believe the case of Cleary v. Shand,
48 Utah 640, 161 Pac. 453, states the Utah rule concerning
proof that can be admitted related to the value of growing trees independent of the land. That case said:
"But some courts have made exceptions to the general
rule; and it is with reference to these that the disagreements arise. One of them. is that, when the
amount of damages is entirely de~andent upon a question of value, many courts in different jurisdictions

4
have permitted qualified witnesses to give their direct
opinion as to the amount of damages. 5 Ency. of Evidence, 686. +++ ."
The court in the Cleary case then went on to say they
were inclined to follow the rule stated above but that the
Cleary case was for other reasons not one to fit within the
above stated rule (P. 643 oif 48 Utah).
In the Cleary case the court also stated:
"If the thing destroyed, although it is part of the realty,
has a value which can be measured and ascertained

without reference to the value of the soil in which it
stands, or out of which it grows, the recovery must be
for the value of the thing destroyed, and not for the
difference in the value of the land before and after
such destruction." (Emphasis added)

While we believe the Cleary v. Shand case cited above
was sufficient authority for the Court to admit opinion evidence as to the value of the trees in place without reference
to the value of the land; nevertheless, there is other substantial and modern authority for such procedure. This
rule is stated in 22 Am.Jur. 2d. 208, Section 143:
"Even this rule is not inflexible, however, (speaking of
the general rule) and in a proper case the plaintiff can
recover the value of the trees prior to the injury. Still
other courts hold that damage caused by the destruction of fruit trees may be measured by estimating
either their value as a distinct part of the land or the
difference in value of the land before-and-after their destruction and that where both methods are resorted
to in the same case, the damage must be ascertained
by the jury from all of the evidence."
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In another section under damages, to-wit:
2d 427, Section 326, the authority states:

22 Am. Jur.

"* * • If, however, that Which is destroyed or injured
has a value which can be fairly and accurately measured without reference to the value of the land upon
which it stands, the measure of damages being the
value of such property or the cost of restoring or replacing it, the evidence regarding its value should relate to such actual value or cost of restoration. Thus,
where standing forest timber is destroyed or injured
evidenoe of the value of the timber itself is admissible.
'*'

* """

In 161 A.L.R. at 593, there is an entire annotation devoted to the value of trees as the measure of damage. At
page 594 there is a section related to evidence of the value
of trees as bearing upon lessened value of land. These cases
indicate that the Court should and could consider the fair
and reasonable value of the trees destroyed and not the
di fferenee in the value of the land upon which they stood
before and after the injury. This, in our judgment, is the
better rule.

The rule is again stated in 69 ALR 2d at page 1365.
We contend that the rule is best expressed in the Windfohr
v. John~on Estate case, 58 SW 2d 215, wherein the Court
held that it was proper to charge the jury that the measure of damage was the value of the trees as they stood be~
fore the injury, rather than the difference in the market
value of the land before and after the flooding. The court
said:
"The before-and-after measure of damage is not an inflexible rule but the measure of damages can be what-
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ever comes nearest to affording actual compensation
for the injury. 0 *"
Other cases adopting this rule are: \Vatkins v.
Mountain Home Co-op. Irrigation Co., 33 Idaho 623, 197 p
247; \\.indfohr v. Johnson Estate, 57 S\V 2d 215 (TexasJ.
Loumille & N. R. Co. v. Beeler, 126 Ky 328, 103 SW 300;
A. T. & F. R. Co. v. Geiser, 68 Kan. 281, 75 P 60; Reynolds
v. Great Northern R. Co., 119 ~furn. 251, 138 ~\V 30; Hall
, .. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 126 SC 330, 119 SE 910. 33
ALR 292.)

In llarion v. Nun (1942) 292 Ky. 251, 166 S\\. 2d 298
the Court held that damage to fruit-bearing trees injured
by fire was to be measured by "their reasonable value as
growing trees upon the premises at the time of de::.-nuction;
in other words, such a sum should be awarded as will fairly
and reasonably compensate the O\\ner for being depriYed
of the trees for their intended use: what they were worth
on the premises in their growing state at the time of injWJ·
or dest1uction.''
The appellant states he "took the liberty" on page 6
of his brief to quote from Watkins , .. )fountain Home C-0op. Irrigation C-0., 33 Idaho 623. 19'7 P. 2-±7: hcwe\·er. he
neglected to quote the preceding paragra~h wh:ch was to
the effect that a farmer named Brau,,,crht who had long ex·
perience \\ith trees was allowed to testify as to t.h€ rnlue
of certain fruit and shade t:ree; in~pendent of the la.."'ld on
which they stood. which is t.~e very pro~tion the appel·
lant herein alleges is error. The paragraph GUOted by the
appellant merely st:mds for the pro~t.on t:iat rnai.'1y fac·
tors may be take.'1 into consideration in determ.in.:.r_g the
ntlue of the tree:; "L'l a growing conditior~"
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The respondent produced two expert witnesses, Vern
A. Stratton and Clarence D. Ashton (R. 137, 210). Both
hold graduate degrees in horticulture; both have taught
thc:ir subjects at universities (R. 139, 21), both operated
substantial fruit farms (R. 139, R. 356), both have written p;:ofessional articles on the subject of fruit farming (R.
_;_:J9. R. 212), and the latter was Extension Agent for Utah
:'.)tate Agricultur2 College for 16 years (R. 211), Assistant
County Agent for the Department of Agriculture in Utah
County for 14 years (R. 211), and County Agent for Utah
Cow1ty for 14 yars (R. 212). In addition, he taught at
the University of Teheran for two years in the field of horticulture (R. 211) and is presently Professor in Horticuiture at Brigham Young University (R. 211). Each of
these experts inspected the orchard after the fire. These
men both testified as to the value of the trees in question
IR. 152, 224).
The question is a great deal like the situation in the
Idaho case, Watkins v. Mountain Horne Co-op. Irrigation
Company, Ibid., wherein the neighbor f arrner was allowed
to give his opinion based upon his knowledge of similar
farms and conditions. Here the appellant's sole objection
".eems to be directed to the method Mr. Stratton used to
anive at his conclusion of value. While it may be that
..\Ir. Stratton said that these trees had certain productive
capacity (R. 201) he was not speculating as to what these
tree>s would do but was basing his conclusions on .past expe1ience of similar trees under similar conditions. His entire assumptions are based upon past ex--perience and not
speculative guess work as urged by the appellant. Furthermore, his testimony (Mr. Stratton's) goes only to the
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weight of the evidence and there was other good and substantial evidence to support the judgment of the jury in
the testimony of Mr. Brereton, who had been in the fruit
business since he was old enough to tag along after his
father. At the time of the trial he was 41 years old (R.
49). There was the testimony of Professor Ashton concerning value, and his testimony was never impeached or
impaired. When the appellant says Professor Ashton could
give no basis for his figures, he is merely stating that the
appellant did not cross examine him concerning the basis
of his conclusion (R. 224-230).
The respondent respectfully submits that there was
substantial evidence to support the conclusions of the witnesses as to the value short of speculation, and there was
by 1Jhe same token good and substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict.
PO!Nf II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NO'f ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCT THE JURY.
Instruction No. 20 given by the court states the
holding of Cleary v. Shand (Ibid.) and uses almost the identical language of Marion v. Nun (1942) 292 Ky. 251, 166
SW 2d 298. It is the opinion of the respondent that this
is not error.
CONCLUSION
The same "interesting proposition" concerning value
per acre raised by the appellant in his conclusion was raised
by the appellant on cross examination (R. 192), to which
the respondent agreed. Apparently the jury did not think
fue value too disproportionate. The jury's conclusion is
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probably based on the testimony of the respondent and the
jury's view of the neighborhood, showing that Mr. Brereton
lived in one of Provo's more attractive middle-class neighborhoods and that his land could have been used for subdivision or housing purposes, unless he had a better and
higher use for the property. It is probably also based oo
the simple fact and "interesting proposition" that those
same trees would yield a net profit to Mr. Brereton of approximately $20.00 a year, a price which is $2,160.00 per
year per acre or over a 10 year period $21,600.00 (R. 203).
This, considered in light of the life expectancy of pear and
peach trees of 75 years (R. 133) makes the jury's conclusion even less surprising. It certainly explains why Mr.
Brereton maintained his orchard rather than alter the use
of his land. It also demonstrates the reasonableness of the
verdict.
The respondent W"ges this Court to affirm the verdict.
Respectfully submitted,

Jackson B. Howard, for
HOW ARD AND LEWIS

Mailed a copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, to
Dallas Hi. Young, Jr., Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, 48

Nor1Jh University Ave., Provo, Utah, this
December, 1966.
Jackson B. Howard

day of

